Some thoughts on MMP…

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Wellington Mayor, Celia Wade-Brown, helps to put up one of the first MMP billboards for the Keep MMP Campaign.

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With the referendum over, and the New Right assault on MMP defeated, it’s time to have a look at proposals  for changes to MMP…

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Waka-jumping Law

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It’s been suggested that we need a new “waka jumping” Law to prevent MPs from leaving their political party, once elected into Parliament.

This was a considerable problem in the 1996-99 Parliament, where MPs were deserting their home-Parties at a dizzying speed; Alemain Kopu from The Alliance; and eight MPs from NZ First.

However, since then, it has not been a problem and we’ve not seen such defections for over a decade. Two notable exceptions,

“Turia, a junior minister, once informed that voting against the government would appear “incompatible” with holding ministerial rank, announced on April 30, 2004 her intention to resign from the Labour Party. Her resignation took effect on May 17, and she left parliament until she won a by-election in her Te Tai Hauauru seat two months later.” – Wikipedia

“Hone Harawira’s  resignation from the Maori Party caused the Te Tai Tokerau by-election, held on 25 June 2011, which he won with a majority of 1117.”

My view is that a Waka Jumping Law is not required as  both Turia and Harawira resigned from Parliament, forcing by-elections which they both won.

Furthermore, there may come a time when an MP leaves his/her Party because a policy change is so radical and inimical to their Party’s original manifesto, that they cannot in good conscience continue to be a member.  Jim Anderton’s resignation from the Rogernomics-dominated Labour Government of the 1980s is a clear example.

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5% threshold

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There has been suggestion that the 5% threshold for Parties to gain seats in Parliament is too high.

In some countries that use various system of proportional representation, the thresholds are set low or are non-existant.  In Israel, the threshold is 2% (previously 1%). In Italy, the threshold is 4%.

If we lower the threshold, expect one or two additional smaller parties to win seats in Parliament. For example  (if my math is correct),

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Actual and Potential Seats Allocation in Parliament under Actual 5% Threshold and Possible 4% Threshold:

	2008 General Election – Actual Results – 5% Threshold Seats	2008 General Election – Theoretical Results – 4% Threshold Seats
National	58	55
Labour	43	42
Green Party	9	9
ACT	5	5
Maori Party	5	5
Jim Anderton	1	1
Peter Dunne	1	1
NZ First	0	5

Total Seats in Parliament

122

123

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Under a 4% threshold, the addition of five seats for NZ First changes the seat allocations for National and Labour, and alters the dynamics of possible Coalition arrangements,

National + ACT + Dunne = 61

Labour + Greens + NZF = 57

The five Maori Party’s  seats becomes critical and effectively a “king maker” in this scenario,

National + ACT + Dunne + 5 MP = 66

Labour + Greens + NZF = 57

or

Labour + Greens + NZF + 5 MP = 62

National + ACT + Dunne = 61

Personally, I’m neutral when it comes to a 5% or 4% threshold, as both allow for representation for reasonable number of voters.

However, I would not favour a lower threshold, as that becomes overly complicated with numerous smaller parties gaining seats.

Voters are concerned enough with the mythical “tail-wagging-the-dog” bogeyman, without adding just cause to their misinformed belief. I would want to see MMP embedded more solidly in our collective consciousness before going below a 4% threshold.

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Electorate Seat Threshold/Dispensation

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As well as the 5%  Party threshold, there is a secondary “threshold” – the Electorate Seat Win.

As the law currently stands, a Party must win 5% of the Party Vote to gain seats in the House. But, if a small Party wins an Electorate Seat, the 5% threshold is dispensed with. Extra MPs, from the small party’s Party List can enter Parliament, on the “coat tails” of the Electorate MP’s success.

(Hence why National supported John Banks’ efforts to win Epsom. )

This curious situation can result in the contradictory result where, in 2008, NZ First won 4.07% of the Party Votes – but gained no seats in Parliament because they did not cross the 5% threshold. At the same time, ACT won 3.65% of the Party Vote (less than NZ First) – but gained five seats in Parliament; one electorate and four Party List seats.

Because ACT’s Rodney Hide  had won an Electorate Seat, they gained a dispensation for the 5% threshold, and Hide brought four extra MPS into Parliament as a result.  (3.65% Party votes = 5 seats in Parliament)

It seems  manifestly unfair that ACT’s 85,496 Party Votes translated into 5 seats in Parliament – but NZ First’s 95,356 Party Votes got them no seats at all (because they didn’t cross the 5% threshold or win an Elecorate Seat).

It is my belief that the Electorate Seat Threshold/Dispensation be done away with. There seems no practical rationale for it’s existance and merely serves to throw up contradictory inconsistancies such the the example above.

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Electorate Candidates vs Party List Candidates

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This may well be the major debating issue for any reform of MMP; whether or not candidates should be able to stand for both an Electorate Seat and on the Party List as well.

Currently, a candidate for Party X can stand as an Electorate Candidate as well as have their name on his/her party’s Party List. Or, the same same may stand only as an Electorate Candidate – but not appear on the Party List. Or vice versa.

Some people have suggested that having a candidate stand in both an Electorate and on the Party List is somehow “undemocratic”. The most common disparagement is that “losing candidates sneak back in on the Party List“.

I disagree.

Not only is that criticism indicative of a lack of understanding of how MMP works – I suggest it is, in itself, a “sneaky” harking back to the days of FPP (First Past the Post), where the “winner takes all”.

Judging by electorate-by-electorate results, those who oppose MMP tend to be National Party supporters,

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Electorates that voted to Change from MMP

Electorate	Vote to Keep MMP	Vote to Change from MMP	Preferred Alternative	Winning Candidate
Bay Of Plenty	49.50%	50.50%	FPP – 48.4%	Tony Ryall (Nat)
Clutha-Southland	44.60%	55.40%	FPP – 58.1%	Bill English (Nat)
Helensville	46.60%	53.40%	FPP – 44.4%	John Key (Nat)
Hunua	46.40%	53.60%	FPP – 49.4%	Paul Hutchinson (Nat)
Kaikoura	49.60%	50.40%	FPP – 52.5%	Colin King (Nat)
North Shore	49.40%	50.60%	FPP – 37.9%	Maggie Barry (Nat)
Rangitata	48.30%	51.70%	FPP – 57.9%	Jo Goodhew (Nat)
Rodney	46.40%	53.60%	FPP – 44.9%	Mark Mitchell (Nat)
Selwyn	49.40%	50.60%	FPP – 50.8	Amy Adams (Nat)
Tamaki	47.30%	52.70%	FPP – 38.1	Simon O’Connor (Nat)
Taranaki-King Country	46.70%	53.30%	FPP – 53.3%	Shane Ardern (Nat)
Tukituki	49.80%	50.20%	FPP – 49.3%	Craig Foss (Nat)
Waikato	47.60%	52.40%	FPP – 52.1%	Lindsay Tisch (Nat)
Waitaki	47.60%	52.40%	FPP – 55.3%	Jacqui Dean (Nat

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Electorates that voted to Keep MMP – By Narrow 1%-4% Margin

Electorate	Vote to Keep MMP	Vote to Change from MMP	Preferred Alternative	Winning Candidate
Coromandel	50.30%	49.70%	FPP – 52.3%	Scott Simpson (Nat)
East Coast Bays	51.30%	48.70%	FPP – 42.2%	Murray McCully (Nat)
Epsom	50.10%	49.90%	SM – 35.9%	John Banks (ACT)
Invercargill	50.80%	49.20%	FPP – 58.1%	Eric Roy (Nat)
Napier	51.40%	48.60%	FPP – 49.3%	Chris Tremain (Nat)
Northland	52.00%	48.00%	FPP – 50.8%	Mike Sabin (Nat)
Pakuranga	51.10%	48.90%	FPP – 42.9%	Maurice Williamson (Nat)
Rangitikei	50.70%	49.30%	FPP – 51.1%	Ian McKelvie (Nat)
Taupo	50.50%	49.50%	FPP – 52.0%	Louise Upston(Nat)
Tauranga	51.50%	48.50%	FPP – 45.9%	Simon Bridges (Nat)
Waimakariri	51.10%	48.90%	FPP – 53.3%	Kate Wilkinson (Nat)
Wairarapa	50.50%	49.50%	FPP – 51.9%	John Hayes (Nat)

Sources for Data

Electorate Status

Referendum Data

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Not one single electorate that returned a Labour candidate voted to change from MMP.

Which is ironic, considering that the candidates who “sneak back in on the Party List” often tend to be National candidates – and often quite high ranking ministerial ones, at that.

Two cases-in-point; Paula Bennet (Nat) and Hekia Parata (Nat),

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Waitakere: Electorate & Party Vote Results

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Candidate	Electorate Votes	Party Votes	Result
Carmel Sepuloni (Lab)	13,468	11,577	Electorate win to Lab
Paula Bennett (Nat	13,457	12,534	Party Vote win to Nat
Difference	Sepuloni +11	Bennett +957

Source for data

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Mana: Electorate & Party Vote Results

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Candidate	Electorate Votes	Party Votes	Result
Kris Faafoi (Lab)	16,323	12,999	Electorate win to Lab
Hekia Parata (Nat)	14,093	13,754	Party Vote win to Nat
Difference	Faafoi +2,230	Parata +755

Source for data

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In both cases, each candidate did well, winning in separate categories of either Electorate Votes or Party Votes.

If  candidates were prevented  from standing in both Electorate and on Party Lists, then had Parata and Bennett stood only in their respective Electorates, both would be out of Parliament.

There appears to be no rational reason to ban candidates from standing on both Electorate and Party List platforms – except that it appears to be a reactionary resentment from some partisan voters against unsuccessful Electorate candidates from making it into Parliament – even though those same candidates appear to win more Party Votes than their opponants.

Claiming that Bennett and Parata have  “sneaked back in on the Party List” ignores the fact that both women won more Party Votes than their opponants. In effect, Bennett and Parata  earned their right to be returned to Parliament.

We should also consider that banning candidates from standing on both Electorate and Party List platforms could have unintended consequences;

• Creating an unnecessary division between List and Electorate candidates that would serve no useful purpose, except to satisfy heavily partisan voters.
• A return to the concept of “safe seats”, where prominent/popular candidates would stand in such “safe seats”, and less popular/prominent candidates would be nominated for more marginal seats, making  strategic placings of candidates  more likely.
• More highly valued candidates would be List only candidates, as Parties would not want to risk losing certain talents on risky Electorate contests.
• A marginalisation of List candidates at Electorate candidates-meetings. One might envisage community meetings where Electorate candidates are invited to address the public – but List Candidates are not, as they are not seen to “represent” any particular geographic area.

It appears to me that banning candidates from standing on both Electorate and Party List platforms actually creates unnecessary separation and  reduces our choice of candidates.

People who promote banning candidates from standing on both Electorate and Party List platforms may actually be shooting themselves in the foot. They may find that far from making MMP fairer, such an arbitrary separation of Electorate and List candidacies may have unintended consequences that they may regret.

Judging by comments on various internet Forums, it appears that most proponants of banning candidates from standing on both Electorate and Party List platforms are partisan National voters. They should take a moment to consider that at least two  high ranking Ministers (as well as others such as Chris Finlayson and Kate Wilkinson, in 2008) would no longer be in Parliament if  List and Electorate candidacies were separated.

As usual, the  Law of Unintended Consequences applies.

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Related stories

Public’s views on MMP must be heard

How to fix MMP

Electoral Commission: Results by Electorate for the 2011 Referendum on the Voting System

Electoral Commission: Official Count Results – Electorate Status

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